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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 13-2259 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS, 
                   Appellant 
______________ 
 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 (D.C. Crim. No. 11-cr-00853-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Claire C. Cecchi  
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 16, 2014 
____________ 
 
Before: RENDELL, ROTH and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed:  February 21, 2014) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 Christopher Williams pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to 
being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).  In the 
agreement, which Williams signed, he stipulated that his total offense level under the 
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Sentencing Guidelines was 23, and that he voluntarily waived his right to file “any appeal 
. . . which challenges the sentence imposed by the sentencing court if that sentence falls 
within or below the Guidelines range that results from the agreed total Guidelines offense 
level of 23.”  (AA24).  The Guidelines range for a defendant such as Williams, with a 
criminal history category of V and a total offense level of 23, is 84 to 105 months’ 
imprisonment.  Williams was sentenced to 92 months’ imprisonment, well within that 
range.  His appointed counsel has filed an appeal on his behalf, and has moved to 
withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).  We will dismiss the appeal 
and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.   
 This case reaches us in an unusual posture.  Typically, where there has been a 
guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant, if he appeals, raises, in his 
opening brief, the reason or reasons why he believes the sentence that was imposed or the 
conviction itself should be set aside.  And, typically, if there has been an appellate 
waiver, the government, in its responsive brief, will invoke that waiver, arguing why it 
should be enforced and, failing that, why the reason or reasons the defendant has raised 
for invalidating the sentence or the conviction are without merit.  Then, typically, the 
defendant comes back, seeking, for one reason or another, to set aside the appellate 
waiver, a reason that would not, of course, have been raised before the district court, and 
so is unpreserved, and, thus, reviewed for plain error.  The reviewing court must then 
determine whether it has jurisdiction to review the issues raised by the defendant or 
whether it will enforce the appellate waiver and not reach those issues.  If it concludes 
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that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal and that the 
merits issues pursued on appeal fall within the waiver, it will dismiss the appeal—unless, 
of course, enforcing the waiver would work a miscarriage of justice.  See United States v. 
Corso, 549 F.3d 921, 927 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v. Gwinnett, 483 F.3d 200, 203 
(3d Cir. 2007).1
 This case is not “typical,” however, because counsel has not raised even one 
arguable issue on the merits, simply concluding that there are no non-frivolous issues for 
appellate review because the plea procedure was constitutionally and procedurally sound 
and that any appeal by Williams is barred by his appellate waiver.  This, counsel seems to 
believe, is how one complies with Anders.  The government, quite understandably if 
somewhat disingenuously, has no problem with defense counsel’s conclusions.  We say 
“somewhat disingenuously” because, while at several points in its submission, the 
government is quick to “agree that the issues identified by defense counsel have no basis 
in law or fact,” Appellee Br. at 6; see also id. at 1, 8, defense counsel had not identified 
even one.   
   
 Under Anders, if appointed counsel finds an appeal “to be wholly frivolous,” 
counsel may “so advise the court and request permission to withdraw” by filing a “brief 
referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.”  Anders, 386 
U.S. at 744.  Nothing is offered here, and so there has been at least technical 
                                                 
1  We recognize that our cases are somewhat inconsistent as to whether, in the face of a 
valid appellate waiver, we will dismiss the appeal because we lack jurisdiction to proceed 
to the merits or whether we will affirm the judgment of a district court.  We leave a 
discussion of that inconsistency for another day.   
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noncompliance with Anders because, we suppose, in counsel’s view, there simply isn’t 
“anything.”   
 We have, nonetheless, reviewed the record in this case and our review satisfies us 
that there are no non-frivolous issues as to the waiver of appeal, the validity of the guilty 
plea itself, or the sentence that was imposed, and Williams has not offered any worthy 
argument to the contrary in the Informal Brief he has filed;2 indeed, in that brief, and as 
particularly relevant here, he did not even mention, much less challenge, his waiver of 
appeal.  The waiver was uncomplicated and clearly described both in the plea agreement 
that Williams acknowledged, by his signature, he had read and understood, and in open 
court, when he confirmed that understanding, albeit on a somewhat minimal exchange 
with the District Court.3
 Because the frivolousness of any appeal here “is patent,” United States v. 
Coleman, 575 F.3d 316, 321 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted), we will 
dismiss the appeal and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. 
   
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Williams’ Informal Brief was received well after the United States filed its brief.  The 
United States has responded to his submission in a supplemental brief it seeks leave to 
file. 
3  And we caution the District Court that, where there has been a waiver, more care be 
given to framing the appropriate language notifying a defendant of any right to appeal 
following the imposition of sentence.  See Corso, 549 F.3d at 930, n.2.   
